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IS YOUR PROGRAMME FALLING BEHIND?

Programme Recovery

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Evidence of Scale

Relevant scale indicators include:

• recovery, troubled delivery and high-risk delivery environments involving total contract values up to approximately £150m;
• programme and delivery environments ranging from approximately £500k to £22m;
• portfolio and wider transformation environments up to approximately £30m;
• service transition and SIAM-related activity within a wider transformation programme valued at approximately £70m+;
• transformation environments involving multiple strategic suppliers, service towers, incumbent suppliers, incoming suppliers and operational delivery teams;
• governance, delivery-assurance and operating-model activity across a UK central government departmental HQ and more than 19 arms-length bodies, strengthening cross-organisational visibility, assurance and delivery control;
• compilation, management and governance of approximately 750,000 architecture artefacts;
• global financial-services supplier governance involving approximately 7,000 suppliers across 35+ locations;
• senior stakeholder engagement across CIO, Deputy CIO, Directors, Programme Board, Executive Committee, SRO, supplier, commercial, operational and technology leadership environments.

Governance, Accountability and Supplier Control

·      governance and assurance structures implemented to improve executive visibility, escalation control,

       delivery reporting and decision-making confidence;

·      governance frameworks operationalised as practical assurance, escalation, funding-control or delivery-

       control mechanisms rather than remaining advisory models;

·      organisational accountability clarified or redesigned where fragmented ownership, unclear decision rights

       or dispersed delivery control were weakening performance;

·      supplier accountability clarified within complex delivery, transition, multi-supplier and supplier-exit

       environments;

·      supplier exit, onboarding, service-transition and multi-supplier dependencies brought under clearer

       governance and delivery control;

·      senior stakeholder alignment improved where leadership disagreement, supplier tension, unclear

       accountability or conflicting delivery assumptions were obstructing recovery.

Operational, Commercial and Service Outcomes

·      operational readiness, service transition control and BAU transition planning improved across complex

       service-transition and SIAM-related environments;

·      operational continuity protected or strengthened in high-risk service transition, national emergency,

       regulated and multi-supplier delivery environments;

·      supplier-governance and commercial-control frameworks implemented to improve visibility,

       accountability, risk control and financial oversight;

·      cost reduction, cost avoidance and savings outcomes identified, enabled or realised through governance

       repair, supplier control, licence optimisation, delivery review and commercial intervention;

·      executive stakeholders provided with clearer options, delivery-risk insight, recovery recommendations and

       practical decision-support in complex delivery environments.

5 Evidence Examples

Evidence Example 2 — DVSA: Service Transition, SIAM and Programme Recovery Environment

Situation

DVSA was undertaking major transformation activity involving SIAM implementation, service transition and multi-supplier operating model change.

The organisation had not previously operated a SIAM model and lacked the service transition maturity, transition governance structure, operational readiness and Service Transition Strategy required to move confidently from transformation into BAU.

The wider transformation environment involved multiple suppliers, service towers, incumbent supplier exit considerations, incoming supplier dependencies and organisational delivery dependencies, with transition delivery operating inside a programme environment valued in excess of £70m.

Intervention

A structured due diligence and recovery-oriented assessment was undertaken across service transition, SIAM governance, operational readiness, supplier dependencies, workstream maturity, delivery feasibility, contract and commercial dependencies, incumbent supplier exit readiness and programme direction.

This included engagement with programme leadership, supplier representatives, operational stakeholders, Programme Board, Senior Leadership Team and Executive Committee-level governance.

The work moved beyond advisory commentary. It identified practical weaknesses in transition governance, supplier exit readiness, operational design, BAU service readiness and SIAM operating-model maturity, then shaped the governance and delivery approach required to stabilise transition activity, strengthen transition control and improve delivery confidence.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

·      wider transformation programme valued in excess of £70m;

·      service transition budget control of approximately £2.7m;

·      SIAM and service transition activity across multiple suppliers and service towers;

·      transition planning affecting approximately 2,300 users;

·      supplier dependencies involving Atos and Capita;

·      incumbent supplier exit, incoming supplier transition and multi-supplier operating-model considerations;

·      governance engagement across Programme Board, Senior Leadership Team and Executive Committee

       environments.

Outcome

The assessment and intervention helped define the service transition strategy, strengthen SIAM governance, clarify operational readiness requirements and establish a more controlled route from transformation, through service transition and into BAU.

It provided executive leadership and senior stakeholders with a clearer view of delivery risk, service transition feasibility, governance gaps, supplier dependencies, additional cost exposure and commitments, operational readiness and the practical actions required to improve delivery confidence.

The work strengthened service transition control and transformation assurance by clarifying what was required to move from transformation activity into an operational SIAM and service management environment with greater confidence, control, organisational readiness and operational readiness.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This is directly relevant to programme recovery because the work involved diagnosis of a complex delivery environment, assessment of governance weakness, supplier dependency control, executive advisory and assurance, service transition feasibility and practical recovery planning within a major transformation setting.

It demonstrates the ability to strengthen control in a high-risk service transition environment where service transition and SIAM maturity, supplier exit, service-tower transition, operational readiness and BAU transition planning needed to be brought under clearer governance, assurance, delivery control and transparency.

Evidence Example 3 — Defra: Enterprise Architecture Governance and Delivery Assurance Framework

Situation

Across the Defra family, enterprise architecture and technology governance was fragmented across a central government department and more than 19 arm’s-length bodies, with inconsistent local approaches, limited cross-organisational alignment and insufficient central visibility over technology planning, assurance and delivery control.

The enterprise architecture environment had previously failed to provide the level of governance, delivery assurance, cross-organisational control and strategic technology direction required across the wider Defra family.

This affected technology planning, duplication control, investment alignment and the ability to support long-term convergence across a complex organisational estate.

The absence of a consistent governance framework made it harder to control duplication, align investment decisions, manage delivery assurance and support long-term strategic technology convergence.

Intervention

A new enterprise architecture governance and operating model was designed and implemented across the Defra family.

This included establishing the Network Architecture Design Board, defining governance processes, creating assurance controls, engaging Chief Executives, CTOs, Managing Directors, Vice Presidents and operational leads, and aligning strategic supplier activity with the new governance model.

The governance framework was implemented as a practical operating control mechanism. It provided a structured route for assurance, escalation, approval and funding-control decisions, strengthening visibility, governance control and decision-making across participating organisations.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

• governance implementation across a central government department and more than 19 arm’s-length bodies;
• enterprise architecture and governance activity affecting approximately 10,000 users;
• operational compilation, management and governance of approximately 750,000 architecture artefacts;
• strategic roadmapping covering a 5–7 year convergence horizon;
• engagement with IBM as strategic supplier;
• engagement across Chief Executive, CTO, Managing Director, Vice President and operational leadership communities;
• estimated cost avoidance / savings of approximately £2m in year one and £4m in year two.

Outcome

The governance framework improved cross-organisational visibility, strengthened delivery assurance, reduced duplication, created clearer technology-governance controls and supported a longer-term convergence roadmap.

It provided a repeatable governance structure for assessing, approving and controlling technology-related delivery activity across a complex organisational landscape.

The framework also strengthened executive visibility and decision-making by turning enterprise architecture governance into a practical assurance, approval and funding-control mechanism rather than a disconnected advisory activity.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This is relevant to programme recovery because falling programmes frequently deteriorate when governance is fragmented, decision rights are unclear, assurance is weak, controls are inconsistent and executive visibility is limited.

The Defra example demonstrates practical experience restoring governance control, strengthening delivery assurance, improving executive visibility and implementing a repeatable control framework across a complex multi-organisation environment.

It is particularly relevant where programme recovery requires governance repair, assurance controls, supplier alignment, investment discipline, roadmap correction and stronger executive decision-making.

Evidence Example 4 — Defra: National Animal Disease Response Governance, Control and Organisational Accountability Redesign

Situation

Following national disease-response activity, systemic governance, accountability and operational coordination weaknesses were identified across Defra HQ, operational agencies, arms-length bodies and strategic suppliers.

The delivery environment involved high operational pressure, public-sector multi-agency complexity, cross-agency coordination, cross-organisational reporting, ministerial visibility, senior-leadership scrutiny and nationally significant operational consequences.

The existing model had fragmented coordination and reporting arrangements, with operational accountability spread across different parts of the Defra family.

During national disease outbreak response activity, different parts of Defra, operational agencies and arms-length bodies could activate overlapping processes, undertake similar information-gathering activity and collect duplicate or partially overlapping data relating to the same outbreak, location, premises, disease characteristics, transmission risk and environmental context.

This created duplication and overlap across activities, weakened clarity over control, reporting ownership and operational coordination, and made national aggregation of outbreak data more difficult where multiple bodies were collecting or reporting related information through different regional, operational or departmental routes.

Intervention

 A strategic organisational analysis was undertaken across the end-to-end national disease-response delivery chain, including the operational triggers, governance arrangements, control points, reporting flows, data ownership and cross-agency activities activated by different parts of Defra, operational agencies and arms-length bodies during a national disease outbreak response.

The analysis identified weaknesses in accountability, reporting lines, operational coordination, data ownership, funding alignment, cross-agency governance and the aggregation of outbreak-related information where different organisations were collecting overlapping data against the same national disease-response event.

A revised operating and governance model was proposed, introducing clearer lines of accountability, responsibility, coordination and reporting across the national disease-response environment.

The proposed model centralised operational coordination of national disease outbreak response activity within the primary disease control agency, including cross-Defra family operational coordination, data collation, data aggregation and ownership of the consolidated operational reporting position.

It also introduced revised ministerial-level reporting lines and created a parallel reporting alignment with Defra Policy, which had managed the existing fragmented model.

This allowed operational disease-response information to be consolidated through the primary disease control agency while maintaining policy-level visibility, ministerial reporting alignment and a clearer route for executive and departmental oversight.

Scale

Relevant scale indicators included:

• national emergency and disease-response environment involving operational, governance, reporting and coordination activity across the wider Defra family;
• cross-Defra family coordination involving Defra HQ, operational agencies, arms-length bodies and strategic suppliers;
• multi-agency disease-response activity involving different Defra business functions, operational agencies and arms-length bodies activating overlapping response processes, undertaking parallel or staggered parallel information-gathering activity and collecting duplicate or partially overlapping data relating to the same outbreak, premises, disease characteristics, transmission risk and environmental context;
• outbreak-related information drawn from multiple regional, operational, agency and departmental reporting routes, where different bodies were collecting overlapping data about the same disease event, premises, location, transmission characteristics and environmental context, creating the need for clearer ownership of data collation, reconciliation, aggregation and the authoritative national operational position;
• CIO, Deputy CIO, Director General, Chief Executive and ministerial-level visibility;
• organisational accountability redesign covering revised responsibility for operational coordination, outbreak-data ownership, reporting accountability, funding alignment, executive oversight and ministerial-level reporting, including clearer separation and alignment between Defra Policy, the primary disease control agency, operational agencies and arms-length bodies in relation to policy oversight, operational coordination, data aggregation and consolidated national reporting;
• proposed centralisation of national disease-response operational coordination within the primary disease control agency, including responsibility for coordinating cross-Defra family operational activity, collating outbreak-related data, aggregating information from overlapping agency and departmental reporting routes, owning the consolidated operational reporting position and maintaining aligned reporting visibility with Defra Policy;
• revised reporting alignment between the primary disease control agency and Defra Policy, enabling the primary disease control agency to provide a clearer consolidated national operational position while maintaining policy visibility, departmental oversight and ministerial reporting

Outcome

The recommendations were escalated through senior leadership and adopted within the wider national disease-response operating and governance approach.

The revised model supported better delivery of departmental strategic objectives by creating a more effective and efficient disease-control model and associated operational processes. It centralised control for national disease-response coordination, outbreak-data collation, data aggregation and consolidated reporting within the primary disease control agency.

The model improved accountability and responsibility clarity across Defra and the wider family by redefining ownership for operational coordination, reporting accountability, data aggregation and national operational visibility during an animal disease outbreak.

The revised ministerial-level reporting arrangements also enabled significantly greater ministerial visibility, supporting better, faster and more time-critical ministerial decision-making during animal disease outbreaks, where timely operational information, clear escalation routes, authoritative national reporting and rapid decision-making were operationally critical.

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This is relevant to programme recovery because distressed or failing programmes often require more than revised planning activity. They may require organisational accountability repair, decision-right clarification, reporting redesign, governance escalation, data ownership clarification and executive-level intervention before delivery control can be restored.

The Defra example demonstrates the ability to diagnose structural delivery problems where fragmented accountability, overlapping activity, unclear reporting ownership and dispersed operational control were weakening the organisation’s ability to coordinate delivery and maintain a reliable view of the national operational position.

It also demonstrates experience designing practical governance and accountability changes at organisational scale, including clearer ownership of coordination, reporting, data aggregation, executive visibility and ministerial-level decision support.

This is particularly relevant to programme recovery where restoring delivery confidence depends on clarifying who owns delivery control, who owns reporting, who aggregates the delivery position, how overlapping or duplicated activity is removed, how operational efficiency is improved, how escalation routes are strengthened and how senior leaders and ministers receive clear, reliable and timely information to support decision-making.

Evidence Example 5 — Deutsche Bank: Global Supplier Governance, Licence Control and Recovery-Relevant Transformation Delivery

Situation

Deutsche Bank had undertaken a major outsource with HP valued at approximately £750m, covering service provision, application development, the TUPE transfer of staff and the novation of several thousand third-party contract service-provider arrangements.

The outsource materially affected multiple service towers, including data centre facilities, Unix, Wintel, provisioning and other service areas. The outsource was not a clean organisational split. Across the Deutsche Bank estate, different service elements were outsourced at different levels, with partial outsourcing arrangements operating across different parts of the retained and outsourced environment.

This created significant retained-organisation complexity and urgency to establish new retained-organisation capability. The new owners inherited contractual responsibilities, governance expectations and retained-organisation obligations contained within the HP outsource contract, while the organisational-design, governance, accountability and control arrangements required to discharge those obligations were not yet fully in place.

Prior to the outsource, Deutsche Bank had unsuccessfully attempted to resolve the issue of uncoordinated and siloed global software-licence management.

That earlier attempt had failed because of unresolved jurisdictional issues across the US, UK, Germany, Singapore and other global regions; the absence of an agreed central governance board; inability to define the operating model and processes; difficulty accessing and collating retained third-party contracts; language complexity across jurisdictions; regional budgetary control without central override; lack of a comprehensive RACI; absence of a single accountable director; and conflict between senior directors in different global regions.

The inherited situation therefore combined two problems: the unresolved legacy of a previous failed attempt to establish global supplier and licence-control governance, and new contractual obligations created by the HP outsource that required Deutsche Bank to operate retained-organisation governance, responsibility and control arrangements that did not yet exist in practice.

This was not a stalled programme recovery in the narrow sense. Its relevance to programme recovery lies in the inherited failure, troubleshooting requirement, transformation delivery challenge, governance repair, retained-organisation design, supplier-control complexity, stakeholder alignment requirement and regulated global financial-services environment.

Intervention

A recovery-relevant transformation and governance approach was designed to make the retained-organisation supplier, contract and licence-control model workable in practice.

The intervention began with diagnosis of the previous failed attempt, the newly inherited outsource obligations, the retained third-party contract environment, the new director-level accountabilities, regional budget-control issues, supplier-management responsibilities, governance gaps, process gaps and conflicting stakeholder positions across the global organisation.

The intervention defined how the retained organisation would operate in practice, including governance responsibilities, decision rights, supplier-control processes, contract visibility, financial accountability and escalation routes required to discharge the obligations created by the HP outsource.

The approach defined the transformation programme, rationale, governance framework, operating model, processes, risk controls, financial controls, RACI, escalation paths, decision rights and roadmap required to bring the retained supplier, contract and licence environment under clearer global control.

A single accountable owner in the US was identified as having ultimate decision authority, including the ability to veto or make binding decisions where regional or director-level conflict prevented progress. The global governance model operated from the US for coordination and policy setting, while allowing practical accommodation for countries operating on materially different timelines or under different jurisdictional constraints.

The proposed model included a governance board, defined stakeholder roles, formal decision-making arrangements, financial reporting, supplier and licence-control processes, a roadmap for collating existing contracts, minimum criteria for obtaining new service providers, language requirements across more than 39 countries and tooling requirements to store supplier, service, contract and decision information.

The approach also defined how board activity would operate in practice, including governance papers, decision records, reporting responsibilities, financial-accountability information and the administrative support required to sustain the model.

HP was also to be given a seat on the governance board to provide reporting, support compliance with the agreed standards and approach, and align with key senior stakeholders.

Licence control was initially to be managed through a consolidated spreadsheet model, with the intention of reproducing the information into a relational database.

The approach was designed as an implementable delivery roadmap rather than a policy document, enabling subsequent adoption and delivery by the accountable Vice President and implementation team.

Scale

The scale of the Deutsche Bank example reflects the combination of global financial-services complexity, major outsource impact, retained-organisation design, supplier and contract governance, licence-control requirements, decision-right challenges and commercial opportunity.

Relevant scale indicators included:



Outsource, Financial-Services and Retained-Organisation Scale

·  regulated global financial-services and investment-banking environment;

·  approximately £750m outsource with HP covering service provision, application development, TUPE

   transfer of staff and novation of several thousand third-party contract service-provider arrangements;

·  multiple affected service towers, including data centre facilities, Unix, Wintel, and provisioning;

·  retained-organisation complexity following substantial workforce redundancy, transfer of staff to HP under

   TUPE, transfer of day-to-day operational ownership and management of third-party suppliers and 

   independent contractors, and promotion of new service-tower and business-area owners into newly

   accountable roles;

·  retained-organisation obligations arising from the HP outsource contract, requiring new governance,

  accountability, supplier-control, reporting and operating-model arrangements to be defined and made

  operational;

Supplier, Contract and Global Jurisdictional Complexity

·  approximately 7,000 retained third-party contracts requiring improved visibility, control, collation and

   governance;

·  global supplier, contract and licence-management complexity across the US, UK, Germany, Singapore and

   other jurisdictions;

·  language and contract-collation requirements across more than 39 countries;

·  regional and jurisdictional budgetary control issues, with no previous central veto or binding decision

   authority;

Governance, Stakeholder and Decision-Control Scale

·  governance design involving Directors, Vice Presidents, operational leads, procurement, supplier

   management, finance, contract management, commercial management and technology stakeholders;

·  creation of a global governance model with a single accountable US owner, defined escalation routes,

   decision rights, RACI and board-level operating arrangements;

·  global governance-board operating model covering board participation, reporting, governance papers,

   decision records, financial-accountability information, escalation routes and compliance with agreed 

   standards;

·  strategic supplier governance integration through proposed HP participation on the global governance

   board to support reporting, standards compliance and senior stakeholder alignment;

Licence Control, Tooling and Commercial Opportunity

·  licence-control information initially consolidated through a large spreadsheet model, with requirements

  defined for migration into a relational database to support supplier, service, contract, licence and decision

  information;

·  enterprise-level licence agreement opportunities across jurisdictions with similar service requirements but

  different pricing arrangements;

·  savings and cost-avoidance opportunities identified across immediate licence renewals within 1–3 months

  and a longer period of 12–18 month renewal roadmap;

·  longer term projected savings and cost-avoidance opportunities of approximately £16.5m in year one,

  £20m in year two and £12m in year three.

Outcome

The proposed model was presented to the accountable US director, who approved the approach in its entirety without challenge.

The outcome converted a previously unresolved global supplier and licence-control problem into an approved delivery model with defined ownership, governance, decision rights and implementation responsibility.

The model created a coherent global governance framework for retained supplier, contract and licence-control activity, including defined accountability, decision rights, escalation routes, risk controls, financial controls, RACI, reporting arrangements, governance papers, decision records and board-level operating arrangements.

It established a clearer basis for centralising supplier, licence, contract, service, decision and financial-accountability information in the US, while allowing regional and jurisdictional differences to be accommodated within a single global governance approach.

The framework also clarified how HP would engage with the retained governance model, including participation in the governance board to support reporting, compliance with agreed standards, senior stakeholder alignment and visibility of operational delivery issues.

Implementation was then delegated to a newly appointed Vice President and a project team with the capacity to follow the delivery plan through to completion.

The work identified enterprise-level licence agreements that were not being leveraged across jurisdictions. These opportunities enabled cost savings and cost avoidance where similar services were being purchased by different parts of Deutsche Bank under different pricing arrangements.

Savings and cost-avoidance opportunities were identified across immediate licence renewals within 1–3 months and a longer 12–18 month renewal roadmap, based on licence-renewal timing, supplier arrangements and enterprise agreement opportunities.

Longer-term projected savings and cost-avoidance opportunities were identified at approximately £16.5m in year one, £20m in year two and £12m in year three.

Top of Form

Bottom of Form

Relevance to Programme Recovery

This example is relevant to programme recovery because recovery-stage environments often involve inherited complexity, previous failed attempts, fragmented governance, unclear accountability, supplier dependency, poor visibility, regional conflict, weak decision rights, commercial exposure and post-outsource retained-organisation challenges.

The Deutsche Bank example demonstrates troubleshooting and recovery-relevant transformation capability in a regulated global financial-services environment where an earlier attempt had failed to resolve the underlying third-party supplier, contract, software-licence and licence-governance problem, and where a major outsource introduced new retained-organisation obligations, governance requirements, accountability issues and control challenges.

It demonstrates the ability to diagnose prior failure, understand inherited contractual obligations, define a workable retained-organisation operating model, create a global governance model, establish decision-right structures, resolve accountability gaps, define escalation routes, improve supplier, contract and licence visibility, strengthen financial control and design a practical delivery roadmap.

It is not positioned as a stalled programme recovery example in the narrow sense. Its relevance lies in the ability to take ownership of a complex inherited delivery problem, convert unresolved strategic objectives into an implementable transformation model, and establish the governance, accountability, third-party supplier-control, contract-control, software licence-control, commercial-control, cost-reduction and cost-avoidance mechanisms required to make delivery viable.

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